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COPYRIGHTS-LIABILITY OF STORE OWNER FOR SALE OF INFRINGING 
PHONOGRAPH REcoRDs BY CONCESSIONAIRE-Defendant H. L. Green Com-
pany licensed defendant J alen Amusement Company as concessionaire of 
the record departments in twenty-three of its stores. The licensing agree-
ment required J alen's employees to follow all Green's rules and regulations 
and empowered Green to discharge any employee found to be conducting 
himself improperly. The gross receipts of the record department were col-
lected by Green, J alen receiving only the amount remaining after deduc-
tions for the license fee, salaries, and taxes. Although Jalen ordered and 
paid for the records and its employees made all the sales, record purchasers 
were unaware of Jalen's autonomy in the record department. Plaintiff, 
copyright proprietor of several musical compositions, alleged that J alen 
had manufactured recordings of these compositions in violation of section 
IOI(e) of the Copyright Act.1 Plaintiff also alleged that Green had violated 
the same section by contributing to and participating actively in the sale 
of these recordings. The trial court found J alen liable2 but dismissed the 
complaint as to Green. On appeal from the order dismissing Green, held, 
reversed and remanded for determination of damages. A concession licensor 
having control over the employees and benefiting proportionately from the 
sales of a licensee-vendor is liable in the amount of the statutory damages 
assessed for the sale of records infringing on copyrighted musical composi-
tions. Shapiro, Bernstein b Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 
1963). 
The Copyright Act, 3 while not applying to phonograph records as such, 
extends protection to the musical composition-the words and tune-
which represents a part of the composite sound reproduced by the record-
ing disk.4 Once the proprietor of the copyright on a musical composition 
1 17 U.S.C. § l0l(e) (1958). 
2 135 U.S.P.Q. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
s 17 u.s.c. §§ 1-216 (1958). 
4 17 U.S.C. §§ l(e), l0l(e) (1958); see White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 
209 U.S. 1 (1908); SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 330 (2d ed. 1939). Among the many factors 
which contribute to the sound heard when a record is played are the musical composition 
of the composer, the arrangement of the arranger, the style of the musicians, the techniques 
of the recording engineers, the style of the vocalist, the style of the director or conductor, 
and the ability of the record manufacturer to coordinate these ingredients effectively. 
The Copyright Act gives partial protection to the proprietor of a copyright solely on the 
musical composition element. Protection of the other elements comprising the recorded 
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publishes the composition by releasing or authorizing the release of a 
recording of the composition, compulsory, licensing of any and all manu-
facturers complying with the requirements of the Copyright Act is required 
by section l(e) of the act, thus depriving the proprietor of the right to 
refuse to license or to grant an exclusive license. The requirements pre-
scribed by the act are, first, filing notice of intention to manufacture, use, 
or sell with the copyright office and the copyright owner, and second, pay-
ment of a two-cent royalty for each time the composition is recorded on a 
phonograph disk.I• The manufacture of unlicensed recordings, those as to 
which these requirements have not been met, subjects the manufacturer to 
liability for the royalty in lieu of damages and profits, plus a sum not 
greater than treble the royalty as well as costs and reasonable counsel fees 
at the court's discretion.6 The sale of unlicensed recordings, however, while 
also infringing the rights or the copyright proprietor, subjects the seller 
only to liability for the two-cent royalty payment plus costs and counsel 
fees.7 Although two prior cases imposed liability for the sale of infringing 
records, neither these cases nor the Copyright Act provide any guidance 
regarding the application of the act to other than the immediate seller 
of the infringing records. 8 
In the principal case the court held that the term "sellers" includes those 
who "contributed to and participated actively in the sale of" the infringing 
records. In reaching this result the court relied upon a series of dance hall 
cases in which the hall proprietor was held liable for infringement when the 
band played a copyrighted musical composition without authorization from 
the copyright owner. This liability was imposed without regard to the hall 
proprietor's knowledge or control of the selections played or to whether the 
bandleader was considered an employee or independent contractor.9 The 
sound has been achieved primarily under theories of unfair competition, including unjust 
enrichment, misappropriation, "palming-off," and unjust interference. International News 
Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Waring v. WDAS, 
327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937). But see RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, ll4 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 3ll U.S. 712 (1940). See generally Cary, The Common Law and Statutory 
Background of the Law of Musical Property, 15 VAND. L. REv. 397 (1962); Diamond, Copy-
right Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 15 VAND. L. REv. 417 (1962); Com-
ment, 33 So. CAL. L. REv. 190 (1960). 
5 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1954). The royalty due on an LP record with six songs on each 
side would be 6 X 2 X 2 = 24 cents. 
o Ibid. 
7 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 952 (1958); 17 U.S.C. §§ l(e), I0I(e) (1958). 
8 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, supra note 7; Harms, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth 
Co., 163 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal. 1958). Kaufman, J., described the situation in the principal 
case as "[A] legal problem vexing in its difficulty, a dearth of squarely applicable prece-
dents, a business setting so common tl1at the dearth of precedents seems inexplicable, 
and an almost complete absence of guidance from the terms of the Copyright Act. • • ." 
Principal case at 305. 
9 Principal case at 309. The court decided the situation in the principal case more 
nearly resembled that in the dance hall cases than that in the landlord-tenant cases where the 
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similarity between the increased income accruing to the dance hall proprie-
tor from the infringing music and that accruing to Green10 from the in-
fringing records apparently influenced the court. Because the trial court 
had based its dismissal of Green in part on the grounds that Green had 
no knowledge that the manufacture of the records had been unlicensed, 
the court in the principal case, while noting facts tending to belie Green's 
innocence,11 pointed out that liability for innocent infringement is not 
unusual or unjust.12 The innocent infringer has both the opportunity to 
guard against infringement by diligent inquiry and the ability to protect 
himself from liability for infringement by indemnity agreement or in-
surance.13 In addition, the fact that the infringer, innocent or not, is the 
party who profits from the copyright owner's losses was given particular 
emphasis by the court. Although the dance hall cases which were cited as 
authority supporting the holding in the principal case did not require that 
the hall proprietor have knowledge of or control over the infringement, the 
principal case, while noting Green's possible ignorance, emphasized his 
control over Jalen in further justification of its decision.14 
The congressional intent in formulating the Copyright Act was in part 
to obviate the possibility of monop~ly in the music publishing industry.15 
tenant has engaged in copyright infringement. In the latter cases the landlord, held not 
liable for the tenant's wrongdoing, had no knowledge of the infringement, no control 
over the tenant, received no benefit from the infringement, and charged a fixed rental. 
See Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938). 
10 The compensation Green received was ten to twelve percent of Jalen's gross receipts 
from sale of records. If the rental charge had been fixed, rather than a percentage, the 
court would have been faced with a situation more nearly resembling the landlord-tenant 
cases, which it rejected. See note 9 supra. 
11 These facts were that, contrary to trade practice, the record jackets carried no 
manufacturer's name, and that prior to filing suit, the plaintiff's attorneys informed Green 
of the infringement. 
12 See Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 
(1958); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), aff'd, 
344 U.S. 228 (1952); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945); Hein v. Harris, 183 Fed. 107 (2d Cir. 1910); Remick 
Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523 (D. Neb. 1944), aff'd, 157 F.2d 744 
(8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809 (1946); Buck v. Heretis, 24 F.2d 876 (E.D.S.C. 
1928); Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent Infringers of Copyrights, in COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION STUDIES (No. 8) (1957). See also Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 
488, 506, 507 (1892) (printer of infringing work may be liable): Greene v. Bishop, IO Fed. 
Cas. 1128, 1135 (No. 5763) (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (retail seller of infringing books held 
liable). 
13 Letter from Ralph S. Brown appended to Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent 
Infringers of Copyrights, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION STUDIES (No. 8) (1957). 
14 See text accompanying note 9 supra. 
15 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909), which states in part: "How to 
protect him [the composer] in these rights [compensation for use of composition and right 
to forbid rendition of his copyrighted music by mechanical reproducers] without estab-
lishing a great music monopoly was the practical question the committee had to deal 
with." See Henn, The Compulsory License Provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law 3, 4, 64, 
in COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION STUDIES (No. 1) (1957); 58 Cowl\!. L. REv. 411, 
412 (1958). 
1964] RECENT DECISIONS 1055 
The choice of the compulsory license at its present meager rate as a method 
of preventing a monopoly seems an unfortunate compromise between no 
protection and full protection for musical compositions. Although the fear 
that a monopoly would develop in the music publishing business if copy~ 
right holders were able to grant exclusive licenses may have been valid 
when the recording industry was in its infancy, it now appears that such a 
fear is no longer justified. The compulsory license has been held inappli-
cable to musical plays, motion pictures, and filmed television programs, 
and from the incipiency of these media there has been no indication of a 
monopoly developing in the use of music in these areas.16 Even though 
leading performers are usually under contract to make records exclusively 
for one company, there has been no indication of a monopoly of talent.17 
The fact that there are many record producers and music publishers now 
firmly established in the recording industry reduces the possibility of a 
monopoly or oligopoly developing should the compulsory license be aban-
doned.18 In addition, there would appear to be no reason why the federal 
antitrust laws should not provide a sufficient sanction to prevent a monopoly 
in this industry.19 
The Constitution speaks of securing to an author the "exclusive right" 
to his works,20 thus encouraging artistic and creative endeavor. It has been 
suggested that giving the composer the right to grant exclusive licenses 
would greatly encourage the creation and use of music, with resultant im-
provement in entertainment value.21 Regardless of the quality of the com-
position, however, the price of the compulsory license remains fixed, the 
statute, rather than the competitive market place, determining its value. 
Increasing the royalty might abate the harshness of the situation, but the 
copyright proprietor would still be unable to choose those with whom he 
wishes to deal. He would therefore be deprived of the right to refuse to 
deal with irresponsible or even dishonest record manufacturers who can 
jeopardize the popularity of a composition by releasing inartistic or faulty 
recordings or who may become insolvent, reducing the copyright proprietor's 
remedy to an injunction which may come too late to be effective.22 A 
record manufacturer who undergoes the publicity expenses connected with 
the first release of a composition may have his efforts absorbed by the 
16 See generally Blaisdell, The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License 33, in 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REvlsION STUDIES (No. 12) (1957). Other countries which have 
granted exclusive rights to authors have not been troubled with monopolies. See Joiner, 
Analysis, Criticism, Comparison and Suggested Corrections of the Copyright Law of the 
United States Relative to Mechanical Reproduction of Music, 2 COPYRIGHT LAW SYM-
POSIUM 43, 58, 64 (1939). 
11 Id. at 34. 
18 Id. at 35. 
19 See generally OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANurnusr LAws 904-08 (2d ed. 1959); White, 
Musical Copyrights v. The Anti-Trust Laws, 30 NEB. L. REv. 50 (1950) • 
.20 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 . 
.21 Letter from Ralph S. Peer reprinted in Blaisdell, supra note 16 . 
.22 17 U.S.C. § IOl(e) (1958). 
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release of any other manufacturer who wishes to obtain the relatively in-
expensive compulsory license. This can prove especially unfortunate for 
the small record producers who can least afford to pave the way for the 
major manufacturers;23 thus it may reduce competition by foreclosing the 
smaller producers from the market for original recordings. 
Insofar as the full measure of existing protection afforded proprietors 
of copyrights covering published musical compositions by the Copyright 
Act should be granted to them to encourage greater quantity and quality 
of musical compositions, the result in the principal case facilitates a more 
effective copyright system. Unfortunately, under the present Copyright Act 
the practical protection given to copyright owners is often less than the 
two-cent royalty the statute provides because collection of even that sum.24 
may be difficult since many of the infringing manufacturers are small, 
obscure, transient operators, often jugdment-proof.25 The extension of 
the liability of the seller to one such as Green, who contributes to the sale 
and profits in direct proportion to it,26 will not only increase the total 
perspicacity exercised in the selection of records for retail sale,27 but will 
also provide still another party-most probably solvent and accessible-
against whom the copyright proprietor may proceed. Although the decision 
in the principal case results in slightly increased protection for the copy-
right proprietor, legislative action is needed either substantially increasing 
the two-cent royalty, or perhaps doing away with the compulsory license 
provision and giving the copyright proprietor the right to grant exclusive 
licenses to record his compositions. Perhaps a combination of these sug-
gestions would serve to remedy the situation; the proprietor could be given 
the right to grant exclusive licenses for an initial period of from six months 
to a year, after which the compulsory license at an increased rate could be 
obtained. This or similar legislation would protect the copyright proprietor 
23 It is argued that if the compulsory license is abandoned records will cost more, 
fewer versions of each composition will be made, the various tastes of the public will 
be circumscribed and fewer records sold, new composers may never get a chance to have 
songs recorded, and small music publishers will not be able to survive. Letter from 
Ernest S. Meyers reprinted in Blaisdell, supra note 16. Even if these dubious prognostica-
tions are valid, they are merely reflecting necessary elements of free competition which 
the recording industry, now well established, seems able to withstand. The theory of a 
competitive economy would seem to require that this industry be treated as others are. 
24 It seems unlikely that the economic factors which influenced Congress to set the 
royalty at two cents per recording in 1909 remain unchanged today. 
25 Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 433, 435 (1953). 
26 Green profited from the agreed percentage of Jalen's gross receipts, but Green 
must also have profited, though less directly, from the customers attracted to the store 
by the record concession. If Green had leased a whole store to Jalen, then, perhaps, the 
landlord-tenant cases, note 9 supra, might have been thought more analogous to the 
principal case than the dance hall cases, but the percentage charge for the rental would 
still create a crucial issue. 
27 Many sellers are now requiring manufacturers to provide indemnification or other 
guarantees that the sellers will not be responsible for recordings not authorized by the 
copyright proprietors. Variety, Oct. 16, 1957, p. 63, col. 1. Green had such indemnification 
from Jalen. 
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during the primary period of popularity of the composition, but would 
not prevent music which has a longer public life from being given extensive 
promotion and release by many record manufacturers. However, until action 
is taken to rectify this anachronism in the copyright law, the rule of the 
principal case does provide copyright proprietors28 with a useful weapon 
in their struggle to suppress piracy of their compositions.29 
Terrence L. Croft 
28 Although the rule of Shapiro, Bernstein 8: Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958) (sellers of infringing records liable for two-cent royalty), 
and the extension of that rule by the principal case better assure copyright proprietors 
of receiving their royalty, performers and licensed manufacturers must still search outside 
the statute for adequate protection of their rights. See Nimmer, Copyright 1956: Recent 
Trends in the Law of Artistic Property, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 323, 346 (1957) stating, 
"[P]ayment of the statutory royalties ••• will not in itself prove a deterrent to record 
pirates since they still will be saving the major costs of employing performers and record-
ing technicians." 
29 Kaufman, J., the author of the opinion in the principal case extending sellers' 
liability, had written a previous opinion which held sellers not liable at all. Miller v. 
Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd sub nom. Shapiro, Bernstein 8: Co. v. 
Goody, supra note 28. 
